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Available online xxxxThe presence of street vending in the urban global South indicates a vibrant economy that is often tagged as in-
formal.When situated in the larger contexts, it persists in an atmosphere of poverty and inequality. Amid the so-
cial conditions that produce economic vulnerability, how do state institutions regulate urban informal vending?
What policies do they enforce tomanage the insecurity, resilience and resistance of street vendors?What are the
emerging patterns from these regulations? This paper presents and analyzes a set of policy epistemologies based
on state rules on informal vending in selected global South cities.
Building on the structuration theory, the paper draws from secondary data and demonstrates that understanding
policy orientations in urban informality requires looking into the structure-agency interaction. It points out the
theoretical and empirical implications of this approach to urban studies and planning research. It proffers a
post-dualist lens in examining rules, relations, and interests in urban informality.






The informality literature has tackled two streams of thought on for-
mal and informal economic activities. While the prevalent perspective
highlights the contrasting features between formality and informality
(Geertz, 1963; Santos, 1979; Sethuraman, 1981; Yatmo, 2008;
Rukmana, 2011; Hanser, 2016; Flock & Breitung, 2016), the alternative
view contends that these two constitute an interlocking system
(Stavenhagen, 1965; McGee, 1973; Portes, 1983; Daniels, 2004;
Dovey, 2012; Roever, 2016). These divergent ideas affect, and are man-
ifested in, policies on urban informality, particularly in the context of
street hawking in the global South.
Street hawking refers to an activity where individuals offer “goods
for sale to the public without having a permanent built-up structure
fromwhich to sell” (Bhowmik, 2005, p. 2256).1 The vendorsmay be sta-
tionary in that they occupy space on the pavements or mobile as they
move fromplace to place by carrying theirwares on pushcarts or in bas-
kets (Bhowmik, 2005). While there have been studies on government
policies and street hawking, the literature mainly focuses on the nature
and purpose of the rules and how they impact on street vendors (Illy,
1986; Peña, 1999; Hlela, 2003; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008; Xue & Huang,
2015; Flock & Breitung, 2016; Batréau & Bonnet, 2016). Beyond policysed interchangeably to refer to
ors use local terms to explain
ts. For instance, Yatmo (2008)
on the level of mobility and
evisiting policy epistemolog
8discourses, the question on how formal state rules on street vending re-
late to the notions of informality remains unexamined. This paper aims
to address this conundrum by revisiting policy approaches to informal
vending and analyzing how they adhere to conceptions of urban
informality.
The paper used secondary data fromacademic literature in revisiting
the policies on informal vending in various cities. It ﬁrst touches on how
informality discourses have evolved. Then, it presents key ﬁndings that
analyze state rules on street vending in selected global South cities.
While the chosen cases are far from exhaustive and there are complex-
ities surrounding the policies in different contexts, the paper argues that
some emerging patterns such as policy models, enforcement mecha-
nisms, agency expressions, and socio-economic conditions demand
deeper examination. These patterns have informed the three policy
epistemologies2 discussed in the paper - the hostile orientation, the tol-
erant atmosphere, and the accommodating environment. In identifying
these epistemologies, the paper links the policy orientations to the con-
trasting perspectives on formal and informal economic activities.
In the ﬁnal section, the paper tackles the implications of these epis-
temologies to theorizing informality, city planning, and urban studies.
Building on the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), it argues on the
need to go beyond the dualistic conception of urban informality. It prof-
fers a conceptual prism – the post-dualist lens, which links the struc-
ture-agency nexus to discourses and policy models on urban informal
practices such as street vending.2 The paper adopts the termpolicy epistemology fromRoy (2005)who argues that pol-
icy approaches are not just techniques of implementation but also ways of knowing.
ies on urban informality: Towards a post-dualist view, Cities (2016),
3 The paper is aware of the debates surrounding the structuration theory. For instance,
Archer (2003) argues that an implication of Giddens (1984) view of structure and agency
is the question on where the structure begins/ends and where the agency begins/ends.
Since the paper never intends to resolve this conceptual issue, it is enough to claim that
both Giddens and Archer hold that structure and agency are related – the structure con-
strains agency that produces it (Parker, 2000). In this sense, the structure and agency
are treated in this paper as a heuristic device.
4 While Giddens and Pierson (1998) refers to agents as human individuals, he recog-
nizes organizations as possible agents depending on the context. In this paper, both indi-
viduals and organizations are viewed as actors with capacity to act as agents. Following
Ling and Dale (2014), the paper refers to agency as “an individual, an organization, net-
works or a community that can enact a process that drives change” (p. 4).
2 R.B. Recio et al. / Cities xxx (2016) xxx–xxx2. Informality: roots and trajectories
Scholarly attention to the informal sector is attributed in literature to
Keith Hart's studies in the 1970s. He described the informal as those
urban poor who engaged in petty capitalism, as a substitute for the
wage employment, to increase their incomes (Hart, 1973). However, in-
formal economic players were already present long before Hart coined
the term as individuals lived on one's wits and survived even without
jobs ofﬁcially recorded by the state (Cooper, 1987). As a result, some au-
thors have regarded the informal economy as an urban poor's survival
technique involving economic activities that could not be strictly tagged
as modern (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991).
These early descriptions indicate the tendency to contrast informal
initiatives against formal practices. This is apparent in Hart's allusion
to urban poor initiatives as a substitute to wage employment (meaning
formal) and in Cooper's assertion of people's ability to survive
despite the absence of state-documented jobs. The International Labour
Ofﬁce's (ILO, 1972) explanation also emphasized that the informal
sector is outside the formal system, as the former thrives on small-
scale operations and relies on skills acquired outside the formal school
system and unregulated and competitive markets. This framing repre-
sents a dualistic conception, which pervaded the scholarly thinking in
the past.
In the last half of the 20th century, a number of scholars came up
with labels that reﬂect a dichotomous picture of economic transactions.
Concepts such as ﬁrm-centred and bazaar economies (Geertz, 1963),
upper and lower circuits of urban economy (Santos, 1979), enumerated
and un-enumerated sectors (Sethuraman, 1981) constitute contrasting
categorizations. Arguably, these constructs represent the contemporary
delineation between formal and informal economies. On the one hand,
the ﬁrm-centred, upper circuit and enumerated sectors broadly ﬁt in
Daniels' (2004, p. 502) formal economy deﬁnition as “the employment
of waged labour within a framework of rules and regulations, usually
devised and implemented by the state”. On the other hand, Portes' in-
formal economy description captures key features of bazaar economy,
lower circuit, and un-enumerated sector. He deﬁnes informal economy
as the sum total of income-producing activities (e.g. production and ex-
change of goods by the self-employed) and the employment in unpro-
tected waged labour (Portes, 1983).
The divergence in contemporary conceptions of formal and infor-
mal economic activities hinges on the role of state rules. While the
formal economy is assumed to be within government regulations,
the informal is placed outside the mantle of state policies. Yet, in de-
veloping countries, there is an increasing acceptance of informal in-
stitutions as legitimate (Jenkins, 2001). What is not acknowledged,
Jenkins (2001) argues, is that the bases of mental models and infor-
mal institutions are embedded in the socio-economic and political
conditions and are coping with the global North-oriented formal
rule of law.
Jenkins' contention draws attention to the structural roots of the
usual formal-informal divide. It hints at the co-existence of both prac-
tices as they get embedded in the socio-economic, cultural and political
relations. Consequently, the dualistic labels appear to be subtle expres-
sions of a complexweb of structural relations. In fact, earlier writers also
pointed out that the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sectors are not mutually ex-
clusive. Rather, they are intricately related (Stavenhagen, 1965) and in-
terlaced (McGee, 1973) as the manufacture and ﬂow of goods are
generated in both sectors (Stavenhagen, 1965). This view connects to
a growing perspective that regards informality not as a separate sector
but rather a series of transactions that link different economies, spaces,
and relations to one another (Roy, 2005; Donovan, 2008; Dovey, 2012).
Informality, Roy and AlSayyad (2004) claim, indicates an organizing
logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transforma-
tion itself. This stance dovetails with the interlocking relations of for-
mal-informal arrangements and actors as evident in the statement
below.Please cite this article as: Recio, R.B., et al., Revisiting policy epistemolog
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.08.018The perceived difference between the formal and informal economy
is, in reality, artiﬁcial in nature. There exists only one national econ-
omywith formal and informal livelihood approaches. Those that are
seen as formal economies are capital-intensive and growth based,
while those that are seen as informal economies are labour-oriented
and people-centred. However, the truth is that these basically inter-
act with one another under a single economy. The perceived differ-
ence lies in the fact that there is a lack of awareness and/or
understanding of the mutual dependency of these two aspects of
the economy (ESCR-Asia, 2002).
Aside from challenging the formal-informal dualistic lens, the
enmeshed perspective draws attention to how the structural factors in-
tersect with collective and individual agents, which arguably generate
the formal and informal schemes.
Ideas that elaborate on structures and agents have been associated
with Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1990), and Archer (1995), among
others. Giddens' (1984) structuration theory3, in particular, offers a
space for analyzing the role of social structures and human agency in in-
formality. For Giddens (Giddens & Pierson,1998, p. 77), society has form
and “that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is pro-
duced and reproduced in what people do”. This underscores the capac-
ity of humans as reﬂexive agents4 to create and recreate social
structures even if they are also shaped by the latter. Describing how
the structuration framework operates, Stones (2005) claims that.
Social structures almost always either have agents within them and/
or are the product of the past practices of agents. And agents, for
their part, have social structures within them, not least in the guise
of particular forms of phenomenological and hermeneutic inheri-
tance. (p. 4).
This interlinked view of structure and agency is important to infor-
mality as it captures how social structures (e.g. economic policies) and
human actions (e.g. resistance) shape the causes, consequences, prac-
tices and beneﬁts of informal economic transactions. As the succeeding
sections would illustrate, the policy approaches and issues inﬂuencing
informality stem from a complex interaction of structural forces with
organizational and individual agents.
Several interpretations of informality relate to the structure-agency
interaction. One is Cooper's (1987) assertion on the ability of informal
economic activities to challenge state hegemony and develop social re-
lationships outside the normative principles of commoditization and
bureaucratization. This argument offers a vantage point where the in-
formal-formal discourse is treated with attention to the capacity of cer-
tain agents to form arrangements that respond to and/or move beyond
what is structurally given.
Portes (1983) particularly zeroes in on this agent-structure link
when he traces the origin of the informal sector. Noting that the formal
versus informal distinction did not exist in the nineteenth-century cap-
italism, he contends that the “absencewas not due to the fact that activ-
ities labeled today ‘informal’ did not exist then, but rather to the lack of a
suitable point of contrast” (Portes, 1983, p. 159). The activities regarded
today as informal were common during the period of classic capitalism
in industrialized countries. The emergence of the formal sector, whichies on urban informality: Towards a post-dualist view, Cities (2016),
3R.B. Recio et al. / Cities xxx (2016) xxx–xxxhas served as the contrasting point, originated from the state institu-
tionalization of the working class struggle to have regular and tenured
work and non-wage beneﬁts (Portes, 1983). What is new, therefore, is
the rise of the formal sector and not the opposite (Portes, 1983). This
contention captures the agent-structure interplay in the context of for-
mal-informal dynamics - the working class as agents demanding better
working conditions and the state institutionalization as part of the con-
sequent structural elements.
Besides Cooper and Portes, Perry et al. (2007) claim that informal
players voluntarily exit from the formal system as a conscious and ratio-
nal decision after a series of cost-beneﬁt exercises. This neo-liberal cal-
culation recognizes the capacity of individual actors to predict the
directions of government policies and adjust their behavior accordingly
(Rapley, 2002). Seen through this lens, informality becomes a rational
economic strategy for informal players and the individual decisions sig-
nify a form of agency, which interacts with structural forces such as
state policies or market demands. In the case of street vending, hawkers
embrace informality, out of rational calculations, to respond or adjust to
macro-economic and formal regulatory systems (Lyons, 2013). In other
words, understanding the formal-informal embeddedness requires ex-
amining the dynamic interaction between agents and social systems.
In street vending literature, agency represents an array of spontane-
ous and planned encroachments of vendors on public spaces (Bayat,
1997, 2000; Musoni, 2010; Hanser, 2016), varied forms of resistance
(Crossa, 2009; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012; Swider, 2015; Flock &
Breitung, 2016), and engagement mechanisms with government units
(Cross, 1998; Peña, 1999; Etimade, 2004; Brown, Lyons, & Dankoco,
2010; Recio &Gomez, 2013; Recio, 2015; Swider, 2015).Meanwhile, so-
cial systems often refer to socio-economic conditions – poverty, unem-
ployment, migration (Musoni, 2010; Swider, 2015; Xue & Huang, 2015;
Weng &Kim, 2016) and state policies aimed at regulating, controlling or
purging informal hawkers (Illy, 1986; Peña, 1999; Hlela, 2003; Etimade,
2004; Setšabi & Leduka, 2008; Recio & Gomez, 2013; Xue & Huang,
2015; Batréau & Bonnet, 2016). Indeed, this growing body of literature
has alluded to the dynamic agent-social systems interaction, which is
evident in how vendors respond to state policies and in how the state
acts as agent in inscribing what is illegal and informal. One argument
even contends that informality is produced by the state (Roy, 2005)
and “there is no pre-deﬁned boundary between formal and informal
practices” (Xue & Huang, 2015, p. 156). The next section builds on
these streams of scholarly work and analyzes state rules on informal
hawking in relation to the preceding conceptual discussion.
3. Policy epistemologies on informality
Examining state rules is critical in understanding how the ideas pre-
sented above relate to policies and enforcement practices. The subse-
quent discussion arises from a critical review of academic literature,
which covers journal articles and books that tackle informality and
street vending policies. Apart from thematic consideration, the litera-
ture survey ensured that relevant cases represent different geographical
locations in the global South. While the chosen cases are far from ex-
haustive and the contexts are unarguably diverse, several recurrent is-
sues echo the need to surface what Sanyal (2010) calls ‘global social
commons’, which are critical to understanding rules, relations and inter-
ests in urban informality. In particular, the discussion below depicts
how policy paradigms exhibit semblance to mental images of informal-
ity. It reveals some emerging patterns in the form of three policy
epistemologies – the hostile orientation, the tolerant atmosphere, and
the accommodating environment.
3.1. The hostile orientation
Numerous studies on urban informality, and street vending in
particular, illustrate a spectrum of policy approaches across different
contexts (Bromley, 2000; Etimade, 2004; Roever, 2006; Yatmo, 2008;Please cite this article as: Recio, R.B., et al., Revisiting policy epistemolog
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.08.018Musoni, 2010; Rukmana, 2011; Gibbings, 2013; Swider, 2015; Hanser,
2016; Batréau & Bonnet, 2016). A common policy demonstrates a hos-
tile handling of informality as an urban phenomenon. The cases below
illustrate how different governments have enforced this policy
orientation.
In Bogotá, Colombia, Hunt (2009) documents how the government
implemented the ‘recuperation’ policy, a relocation effort meant to spa-
tially segregate the street vendors and orient them on market mentali-
ties. This `recovery' of Bogotá's public space focused solely on regaining
it from street vendorswhile ignoring the illegal invasion by cars and pri-
vate formal businesses (Hunt, 2009). For Donovan (2008), the introduc-
tion of municipal elections in Bogotá, which produced mayors eager to
display their ability to impose the rule of law, and the weakening of
street vendor unions, resulted in the series of relocations.
In Mexico City, the Programa de Rescate (Rescue Program) sought to
revitalize and beautify Mexico City's Historic Centre by improving the
area's physical shape and image. One aspect of the program entailed re-
moving certain activities, including street vending,whichwasperceived
to be threatening the general vitality of the area (Crossa, 2009). In Belo
Horizonte, Brazil, this type of urban revitalization locally called Gestão
de Cidades (Management of Cities) enabled the government to build
an indoor market for the relocation of street vendors (Carrieri &
Murta, 2011). In the guise of reinvigorating the city centre, Carrieri
and Murta (2011) contend that vendor relocation actually aimed at
maximizing proﬁt through a neo-liberal kind of management.
The governments in three African areas adopted the same approach.
In Zimbabwe, a law prohibited any kind of cooking or selling of cooked
food on the sidewalks close to Harare'smainmarkets and favoured new
equipment based on ofﬁcial restaurants controlled by the state
(Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). In the process, the law ignored “the efﬁca-
cy of the existing arrangement, which was quick, well adapted to the
market, cheap for the consumer, and proﬁtable for the producer”
(Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991, p. 72).More recently, the Zimbabwean gov-
ernment launched in 2005 the Operation Murambatsvina or Operation
Restore Order, a government strategy to regain control of the informal
economy (Musoni, 2010). This Operation has led to evictions of informal
settlements and loss of livelihood opportunities like street trading
(Musoni, 2010).
Another case is Johannesburg City's policy to reshape the inner city
appearance and transform power relationships. The policy seeks to re-
move traders from the streets and place them in government-provided
markets with appropriate infrastructure and services. Relocating
hawkers to state-regulated facilities aims to end the negative conse-
quences of street hawking and attain a ‘world-class’ city image of Johan-
nesburg by 2030 (Hlela, 2003). In Maseru, Lesotho, Setšabi and Leduka
(2008) narrate how the government evicted street vendors under the
guise of public health and urban aesthetics. They argue that behind
this façade, the reason for eviction is the state's intent to protect the in-
terests of formal businesses and to mask state failure to enforce inclu-
sive and sustainable urban policies.
In some Asian countries, Bhowmik (2005) writes that vendors in
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia constantly experience evic-
tion and harassment from the government. The authorities even burned
down their stalls without providing alternative places to do vending. In
Vietnam, the drive to develop Hanoi as a more ‘civilized and modern
city’ has prompted the local government to ban street vendors from oc-
cupying 62 streets and 42 public spaces (Turner & Schoenberger, 2012).
In the Philippines, while there has been some degree of political accom-
modation of street hawkers, Etimade (2004) and Recio (2010) note the
presence of national laws prohibiting vending activities in public spaces
such as streets and sidewalks, among others.
In China, the ‘global city’ and modern space aspirations of urban
leaders have resulted in abusive policingmeasures and violent encoun-
ters between street vendors and the chengguan, the enforcers of munic-
ipal policies (Hanser, 2016). In Chengdu, the city street appearance was
taken as “an important indicator of the city's well-being,” and policeies on urban informality: Towards a post-dualist view, Cities (2016),
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commercial activity on the street, includingwhere andwhen street ven-
dors could operate” (Wang, 2003, cited in Hanser, 2016, p. 6). In
Guangzhou, the government has shifted fromamore sympathetic treat-
ment of vendors to a hostile approach in line with its goal of promoting
a competitive city and attaining economic growth. In the process, the
state downplayed, if not totally neglected, the initially appreciated pov-
erty-alleviation contribution of informal vending (Xue & Huang, 2015).
The foregoing cases reveal several crucial points. First, the hostile at-
titude towards informal activities is often coupled with a preference for
formal or state-controlled arrangements (Yatmo, 2008; Musoni, 2010;
Carrieri & Murta, 2011; Rukmana, 2011; Gibbings, 2013; Flock &
Breitung, 2016) to promote a ‘global city’ image (Donovan, 2008; Xue
& Huang, 2015; Hanser, 2016). To a great extent, this policy reﬂects
the dualistic framing discussed in the earlier section. In most cases,
the bias for the formal set-up occurs in situations of poverty (Musoni,
2010; Carrieri & Murta, 2011; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012; Lyons,
2013; Flock & Breitung, 2016), urban migration (Bose & Mishra, 2013;
Alva, 2014; Swider, 2015; Xue & Huang, 2015) and inequality where
the formal employment is unable to absorb a large number of workers.
The usual context also demonstrates how poor people rely on informal
economic activities such as street vending (Musoni, 2010; Xue&Huang,
2015) to earn a living.
Second, eviction and relocation appear to be a common recourse of
the policies critical of informal vending (Donovan, 2008; Yatmo, 2008;
Gibbings, 2013; Hanser, 2016). This has spatial a implication as the
hawkers need to vacate their vending areas and move to designated
places where the state could regulate them. In many instances, reloca-
tion has led to declining income levels with mixed working conditions
(Donovan, 2008; Carrieri &Murta, 2011). In the long run, vendors aban-
don the formalisedmarket spaces and then return to vending areas as in
the case of cities across Africa (Hansen, 2004), Asia (Smart, 1986) and
Latin America (Cross, 1998; Middleton, 2003; Donovan, 2008; Carrieri
& Murta, 2011). In not a few cases, relocation has failed due to ill-con-
ceived location, bureaucratic and costly regulations, and the lack of cus-
tomer drawing power of the chosen spaces (Donovan, 2008; Weng &
Kim, 2016). This inability of the relocation areas to attract customers
forces the vendors to go back to their old locations. As Bromley (2000,
p. 19) noted, “[w]hen customers fail to follow, the vendors have little
choice but to return to the streets”. Amid these issues, the hostile poli-
cies prefer a governing norm that puts premium on legality, image
building, efﬁciency, and order at the expense of economic needs and
welfare of the affected populations.
Third, the habitual excuse for eviction and relocation emanates from
the state's desire to enforce order, which the informal vendors purport-
edly disrupt (Yatmo, 2008; Donovan, 2008; Musoni, 2010; Rukmana &
Purbadi, 2013; Hanser, 2016; Flock & Breitung, 2016; Batréau &
Bonnet, 2016). This reasoning appeals to those who look at urban infor-
mality as the realm of irrationality and potential ground for crime activ-
ities. It relates to Kelling and Coles' (1996) “ﬁxing broken windows”
theory of law and order, which holds that “small, highly-visible forms
of urban disorder quickly lead to breakdowns in community standards
and to the rapid proliferation of blight, vandalism and crime”
(Bromley, 2000, p. 12). Paradoxically, to attain this orderly condition,
the state resorts to harassment and violent eviction.
With these patterns, the hostile orientation becomes a policy narra-
tive anchored on a modernist dualistic framing and neo-liberal agenda,
which favors formal arrangements and embraces control and order. In-
formal vending is seen as a ‘blemish’ (Hanser, 2016), ‘eyesore’
(Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013), ‘out of place’ (Yatmo, 2008) and treated
as part of the unruly practices. Alas, this policy model never attempts
to identify and root out the causes of the ‘disruptive’ vending activities.
It does not recognize how formal systems (e.g. economic policies) con-
tribute to informal and ‘unorderly’ practices, which has been a subject of
critical inquiry by authors such as Yiftachel (2006) and Roy (2005),
among others.Please cite this article as: Recio, R.B., et al., Revisiting policy epistemolog
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.08.018The ﬁxation with the idealized formal and orderly arrangement res-
onates with Holston's (1998) critique of themodernist planning ideolo-
gy. He asserts that the utopian vision of planning never stems from its
aim to disrupt taken-for-granted norms. Instead, “it is utopian because
its notion of alternative futures is based on absent causes and its
methods on a theory of total decontextualization” (Holston, 1998, p.
41). In a way, the hostile rules peddle a decontextualized city image
and a narrative of order to be able to impose a certain type of urban ex-
perience. This creates a policy environment that exalts the modern and
rational formal arrangements and marginalizes, if not obliterates, the
ﬂexible informal practices (Roy, 2009; Yiftachel, 2006). The hostile
legal orientation, therefore, deepens the dualistic formal-informal fram-
ing, which ignores the structural roots of the formal-informal divide and
the agency of various actors involved.
The decontextualized policy framing shows the tendency of state
processes such as planning to be detached from social conditions and
power relations that underpin how economic transactions operate. It
poses a critical challenge for planners and policy-makers since “[t]he
problems associated with vending reﬂect a conﬂict between the ofﬁcial
vision of urban environment and the realities of urban life (Yatmo, 2008,
pp. 397–398). Even the mere presence of street vendors illustrates the
limits and the contested nature of the government's top-down produc-
tion of space (Flock & Breitung, 2016). In fact, amid the strict enforce-
ment of the hostile policies, street vendors have shown a strong sense
of agency as they exhibit different forms of resistance. Through verbal
confrontation, protest actions (Gibbings, 2013), feigned submission,
adaptive resistance (Musoni, 2010), and struggle for right to the city
(Swider, 2015), hawkers demonstrate that resilience and resistance en-
able them to grapplewith thehostile policy environment. In some cases,
vendors' sustained resistance generates a sympathetic and tolerant atti-
tude from the policy-makers. The section that follows examines the
prospects and limits of this lenient orientation.3.2. The tolerant atmosphere
Authors likeMcGee and Yeung (1977); de Soto (1988); Chakrabarty
(2001), and Alcazaren, Ferrer, and Icamina (2011) have recognized the
crucial role of informality in the development and transformation of cit-
ies and urban centres. Because of its enduring presence and the palpable
beneﬁts amid poverty and unemployment issues, some local govern-
ment ofﬁcials take a liberal stance towards urban informal vending.
In Yogyakarta, Indonesia, street vendors gained tolerance to use
spaces in the mid-1980s, a period when informal vending was consid-
ered illegal in the area (Timothy & Wall, 1997). Of late, hawkers who
are not part of the government's ‘formalization’ obtain tacit approval
by paying daily fees to city administration (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013)
and/or bribing local ofﬁcials.
In the Philippines, where the dominant national policy prohibits in-
formal vending, some city ofﬁcials have a tolerant attitude towards
street hawking due in part to poverty issues and the conﬂicting national
policies governing the activity (Recio & Gomez, 2013). In Cebu City, a
metropolitan area in central Philippines, local authorities tolerate ped-
dling, even if it violates certain national and local legislations, as a result
of political leverage created by sustained organizing and lobbying ef-
forts by vendors associations in the urban centre (Etimade, 2004). In
Caloocan, a component city of Metropolitan Manila, the local govern-
ment allows street hawking during Christmas season (from November
to January) out of humanitarian cause (Recio, 2010).
InMexico City, Cross (1998) identiﬁes one category of street vendors
as legally tolerated. This is composed of vendors in residential areas that
provide the same services, tianguis or weekly rotating street markets,
markets on wheels, and ambulatory vendors with ﬁxed or semi-ﬁxed
stalls. Peña (1999) also documents the tendency of government ofﬁcials
in Mexico City to tolerate informal vending when vendor associations
bribe them.ies on urban informality: Towards a post-dualist view, Cities (2016),
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the everyday street encroachment of vendors has gained a degree of tol-
erance from the local authorities (Hanser, 2016). In 2010, for instance,
the Guangzhou authorities resorted to ‘soft approach’ partly due to the
recognition that vending enables street hawkers to cope with the eco-
nomic crisis (Flock & Breitung, 2016). The tolerant approach led to a
condition where local government ofﬁcials designate prime spaces as
zero-vendor zone and certain corners where hawkers can occasionally
sell their goods (Flock & Breitung, 2016).
A scrutiny of these cases indicates that several factors contribute to a
tolerant attitude towards street vending. The ﬁrst factor has to do with
the ability of vendors to engage in the ‘politics of the streets’ (Bayat,
1997, 2000; Musoni, 2010; Hanser, 2016) and/or build associations to
resort to a variety of engagement strategies – from pernicious bribery
schemes to collective political pressure (Cross, 1998; Peña, 1999;
Etimade, 2004; Brown et al., 2010; Recio & Gomez, 2013). In a number
of cases, the everyday interactions, resistance and collective actions en-
able state engagement, which results in negotiated arrangements
allowing the hawkers to continue occupying certain spaces without
the threat of demolition.
Another component that generates a tolerant atmosphere is the dis-
cretionary power of local ofﬁcials and street level bureaucrats (Peña,
1999; Bromley, 2000; Swider, 2015; Hanser, 2016). Government ofﬁ-
cials who have direct contact with vendors tend to allow the latter to
continue their activities within certain bounds (Etimade, 2004; Recio,
2010; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012; Batréau & Bonnet, 2016). The pa-
rameters are deﬁned through dialogues and agreements between
hawkers and government heads.
However, it is important to recognize the limitations of this tolerant
approach. Often, this is contingent on the orientation of heads of local
government units or state agencies in-charge of policing street vendors.
The sympathetic attitude sometimes comes from leaders who have de-
velopmental approach to policy-making and/or those who understand
the complexity of informal economic activities in relation to poverty
and unemployment. Yet, in the absence of a legal instrument that ex-
plicitly permits hawking, the temporary agreements between vendors
and government ofﬁcials may prove unsustainable in the long run.
Worse, in some cases, the tolerant attitude of government ofﬁcials en-
genders, if not entrenches the existing, clientelist or patronage relations
and corrupt practices (Turner & Schoenberger, 2012) involving devious
government ofﬁcials.
These different contextual factors indicate that the strength of the
tolerant atmosphere rests on the nature and extent of vendors' prac-
tices, which enable them to overcome the unfavorable policies. In addi-
tion, the vendor's individual maneuvers and collective initiatives
require government allies who can support their actions. Essentially,
this points to the critical role of organizational and individual agents –
vendor associations, government champions – in creating and sustain-
ing a tolerant atmosphere.
In exploring the contribution of agents, however, it is equally crucial
to be conscious of the structural dimensions that inﬂuence the actors'
interests and behavior. This is important since a tolerant position is
also tied to ambiguous national policies on informal vending (Itikawa,
2004, cited in Roever, 2006; Recio, 2010) in the face of harsh economic
conditions (Roever, 2006; Brown et al., 2010; Turner & Schoenberger,
2012; Xue&Huang, 2015; Flock& Breitung, 2016). The institutional am-
bivalence generated by complex policies renders some local govern-
ment executives indecisive on how to approach street vending. When
linked to economic circumstances that breed poverty and unemploy-
ment, this policy context impels some local governments to have a con-
siderate position on informal hawking. In the Philippines, for example,
some local government ofﬁcials argue that poverty and the lack of eco-
nomic opportunities compel them to bemore lenient on enforcing laws
critical of street vending (Recio, 2010).
Thus, while the tolerant atmosphere primarily results from the ac-
tions and discretion of organizations and individuals – vendors andPlease cite this article as: Recio, R.B., et al., Revisiting policy epistemolog
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.08.018government ofﬁcials – certain structural conditions enable these agents
to accept a relaxed treatment of informal vending. This reﬂects how a
structure-agency interface links the tolerant atmosphere to formal-in-
formal processes. Beyond this tolerant attitude, however, is there a
prospect for a more strategic and responsive policy approach to street
vending? The subsequent section confronts this question.
3.3. The accommodating environment
Contrary to the antagonistic view of urban informality, some institu-
tions have approached it not as a problem for eradication, but as a phe-
nomenon to bemanaged. For instance, the UnitedNationsDevelopment
Program (UNDP, 2008) came up with the Legal Empowerment of the
Poor (LEP) initiative, which builds on de Soto's (2003) assertion that
poor informal players simply need assistance from the government to
be able to unlock their potentials and participate in socio-economic
and political processes.
While this tenet has gained criticisms (Roy, 2009; Lyons, 2013) for
its neo-liberal rhetoric and for failing to consider fundamental issues
such as power relations and market limitations, the UNDP has used
the LEP to advocate for recognition of informal workers' rights in coun-
tries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tanzania (Recio, 2010; Lyons,
2013). In Tanzania, Lyons (2013) pointed out the importance of
amending and repealing existing laws to address legal obstacles and re-
alize LEP's goal of empowering small traders such as informal vendors.
Yet, no study has so far determined whether the LEP has contributed
to improving the lives of informal workers or if it has led to a more efﬁ-
cient institutional architecture for governing informality.
Prior to the UNDP's LEP paradigm, several countries had already ac-
knowledged informal vending in their legislations. A good example is
how the municipal government of Santiago de Chile a century ago rec-
ognized street vending as a legitimate economic undertaking. In 1915,
the local authority developed the city's ﬁrst planned street market,
two decades after the creation of private markets (Salazar, 2003, cited
in Roever, 2006). In 1938, street markets already gained formal institu-
tional status with the formally recognized right to operate in public
space (Aliaga, 2004, cited in Roever, 2006). By themid-twentieth centu-
ry, street vending in Santiago had earned recognition as a legitimate
economic activity and peddlers had become a permanent ﬁxture in
the city (Salazar, 2003, cited in Roever, 2006).
In Lima, Perú, the local government provided a space for street ven-
dor participation in designing an ordinance on street vending. As a re-
sult, the crafted ordinance contains the rights of leaders of vending
organizations to represent hawkers. The ordinance has a structure,
dubbed as Tripartite Consultation Commission,whosemandate is to de-
velop plans and programs with vendors' democratic participation
(Roever, 2016).
In Mozambique, the government recognizes of the existence of ille-
gal but legitimate practices and intends to align the legitimate, but infor-
mal, to conform to the legal position. This trend somehow mirrors the
earlier situation in China, when the initial state recognition of the “indi-
vidual economy”, as a support to the planned economy, opened the
door to legitimate street vending (Hanser, 2016).
In Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while some vendors thrive on tolerance,
others have becomepart of the state's formalization effort, which legally
recognizes most street vendors. One way to ‘formalize’ is through an
agreement with or fee payment to owners of buildings and vacant lots
where vending activities take place (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013). At
the national level, Rukmana (2011) documents how the Indonesianpol-
icy paradigm shifted from a Suharto-era hostile legal framework, where
local authorities had to evict street vendors, to a more sensitive ap-
proach. He points out how the post-Suharto Spatial Planning Law re-
quires the inclusion of the informal sector in the local plans and
mandates public participation in spatial planning.
The situations of street vendors in Thailand andMalaysia are similar-
ly encouraging. They are ofﬁcially recognized and provided vendingies on urban informality: Towards a post-dualist view, Cities (2016),
5 This paper agrees with Healey's (2007) assertion that the tenets of constructivist or
sociological institutionalism build on, and are intimately linked to, the precepts of
structurationism.
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ed sites where vendors can operate. In Malaysia, the government
established a department to ensure that the vendors never obstruct
the pedestrian and keep their places clean. The assigned ofﬁce also orga-
nizes training courses on food, personal hygiene and nutrition
(Bhowmik, 2005).
Besides the aforementioned policy measures, the passage of the na-
tional street vending law in India epitomizes the accommodating envi-
ronment that acknowledges the legitimacy of informal hawking as an
economic activity. Enacted in 2014 after years of campaigning by street
vendor associations (WIEGO, undated), the law has important provi-
sions covering space allocation, government structure, eviction and re-
location procedures, taxation system, grievance and redress
mechanisms, planning norms and processes, social audit, and vendor
participation. While it is never devoid of criticisms (Alva, 2014), this
ﬁrst national legal instrument is a critical step in recognizing the rights
and roles of vendors in urban economy.
These exemplars offer several insights that can inform policy formu-
lation and planning processes involving informal vendors. First, the ofﬁ-
cial recognition stems from the increasing realization that informal
economic activities have a great contribution to how the political and
economic processes operate (Jenkins, 2001; Hanser, 2016). This is es-
sentially an acceptance of the link between the formal and informal eco-
nomic practices. In this sense, the accommodating environment arises
from an enmeshed image of the formal-informal relation.
With the state recognition comes a license or permit as proof of legit-
imacy. This afﬁrms the ideas mentioned above on the state role in legit-
imizing or making certain activities acceptable as an economic
undertaking. Once legitimacy is accorded, the legal accommodation
then entails provision of designated spaces that the vendors typically
use to make a living (Aliaga, 2004, cited in Roever, 2006; Bhowmik,
2005; Rukmana, 2011). This spatial allocation shows that government
plans could actually accommodate informal activities such as street
vending, often maligned as chaotic.
Additionally, the favorable legal environment underscores the value
of policies to accommodate informal practices into formal processes.
That some of these friendly laws were crafted after long and arduous
campaigns by vendor organizations highlights the structure-agency in-
teraction, which the previous section has tackled. What is unclear
though is whether the vendors and their associations still employ infor-
mal mechanisms to govern the spaces and how these intersect with the
formal rules. This remains a major gap even if the cases present a good
starting point on legal recognition and secure vending areas.
At this point, the discussion on the three policy epistemologies –
hostile, tolerant and accommodating – has illustrated how the two con-
ceptions of informality (dualistic vs. enmeshed) are manifested in state
rules on street vending. It has demonstrated the importance of
unpacking the structural factors and the roles of agents in creating,
maintaining, contesting, and transforming state rules. Thus, it is crucial
to emphasize that the policy epistemologies are not mutually exclusive,
as they even co-exist in different cities of a country. They represent the
overlapping governing norms by which local ofﬁcials and street level
bureaucrat deal with vendors by implementing or modifying the legal
instruments on urban spaces (Cross, 1998; Bromley, 2000; Etimade,
2004; Recio, 2010; Hanser, 2016).
A number of arrangements show how the appropriation of spaces is
ﬂuid and contingent on structural factors and agent interventions. This
is seen in layered zones with corresponding enforcement mechanisms
(Swider, 2015; Xue & Huang, 2015). Spaces are designated as off-
limit-heavily-policed territories, areas of tolerance and zones of contes-
tation (Swider, 2015). Xue and Huang (2015), for instance, note that in
Guangzhou evictions concentrate on prime city spaceswhile the regula-
tion is less acute in the outlying districts. Local ofﬁcials tolerate the
street vendors in insigniﬁcant places within the central districts (Xue
& Huang, 2015). This leniency also occurs in Bangkok and Yogyakarta,
where local administrators tolerate the presence of unregisteredPlease cite this article as: Recio, R.B., et al., Revisiting policy epistemolog
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legally some designated spaces (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013; Batréau &
Bonnet, 2016). The layered and calculated mechanisms indicate a spa-
tial hierarchy in policy enforcement, which may arguably result in a
condition where the more afﬂuent hawkers, who are able to afford the
high rent, occupy the best vending locations. It also depicts an uneven
and ﬂuctuating strength of state control over urban spaces (Xue &
Huang, 2015). More importantly, the spatial hierarchy enables street
vendors to subsist in an exclusionary space (Xue & Huang, 2015)
through varied forms of maneuver (Rukmana & Purbadi, 2013) and re-
sistance (Musoni, 2010; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012).
With these interlocking policy orientations, spatialized enforcement
mechanisms, and varied forms of resistance, it is no longer sufﬁcient to
analyze the practices and players in urban economic activities using a
dichotomous lens. At a time when the artiﬁcial divide between the for-
mal and informal continuously gets blurred by structural relations and
adaptive human actions, it may be more conceptually and empirically
useful to examine how social conditions shape and are transformed by
the varying, if not competing, needs and interests of actors involved in
the formal-informal interface. This is explored in the section that
follows.
3.4. The imperative of a post-dualist framing: conceptual, empirical, and
practical implications
The preceding discussion has presented how each policy epistemol-
ogy relates to a certain conception of informality and how it arises from
the structure-agency interaction. For instance, the features of hostile
policy orientation dovetail with the dualistic image of informality.
They both underscore the capacity of the state to impose its will.
While the hostile policy manifests in the government's ability to assert
an orderly image of the city by eliminating those that deviate from the
legal and institutional norms, the dualistic view reﬂects the state
power to inscribe certain activities as legitimate while others are unac-
ceptable. In both framing, there is inadequate discussion of the structur-
al links of formal and informal mechanisms. There is no attention given
to the role of individual and collective agents in shaping policies and/or
legitimizing certain practices.
This iswhere an enmeshed imageof formal-informal nexus becomes
critical. It urges a post-dualist framing of activities, actors, relations and
interests in urban informality. Post-dualist framing, as proposed here,
refers to an approach that is conscious of the inherent relations between
formal and informal economic activities. It seeks to interrogate the fac-
tors, forces, and relations involved in the formal-informal interface.
While cognizant of the immense inﬂuence of the dualist (formal versus
informal) paradigm,which has shapedmuch of scholarly and policy for-
mulation, the post-dualist lens treats the dichotomy as a mere heuristic
device and argues on the need to go beyond the constraints generated
by its ﬁxed categories.
While the post-dualist perspective espouses Giddens' (1984) notion
of structuration in that it acknowledges that the formal-informal rela-
tions are linked to structure-agency interaction, it moves beyond the
recognition of this interplay. It seeks to problematize the contours of
structural elements (e.g. socioeconomic conditions, political structures)
and the forms of agency (e.g. resistance, submission) that drive the per-
ceived duality and relations between formal and informal schemes. It
uses a constructivist or sociological institutionalist approach5 in giving
credence to the roles of social structures and agents in shaping the for-
mal-informal interface. In contrast to ‘new institutionalism’, which uses
economic tools (e.g. game theory) to examine and predict outcomes of
choice situations, constructivist institutionalism views “interests and
preferences, transaction processes and costs as multi-faceted andies on urban informality: Towards a post-dualist view, Cities (2016),
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norms and routines, discourses and practices are created, become em-
bedded as ‘taken for granted’ and then again maybe questioned and
changed” (Healey, 2007, p. 66). In this framing, post-dualist approach
goes beyond a reductionist neo-liberal formulation that treats informal
economic activities as an outcome of cost-beneﬁt calculations of ratio-
nal individual actors. It eschews the highly structuralist argument that
informal economic schemes are primarily an offshoot of processes of so-
cial structures.
Concomitantly, the post-dualist framing calls into question the long
standing approach to informal economic activities such as street
vending. In particular, there is a need to turn a critical gaze on the
order-oriented vision of the city, which promotes a neat and
regimented physical environment without looking into the complex
socio-spatial relations. The tolerant and accommodating policy episte-
mologies seem to tread this path of moving beyond approaches that
perpetuate the dualistic framing of economic activities.
Aside from conceptual considerations, the post-dualist view cap-
tures the increasing institutional recognition that informality is normal
(OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2013) and here to stay (UNDP-CLEP, 2008;
Lyons, 2013; Roever, 2016). This indicates a realization of how the for-
mal-informal practices are embedded in structural processes and differ-
ent expressions of agency. In street vending literature, this appreciation
becomes apparent in notions of ‘adaptive resistance’ (Musoni, 2010),
‘managed informality’ (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016) and ‘informal gover-
nance’ (Roever, 2016), where resistance and governing norms blur the
formal-informal divide.
In terms of spatial dimension, the idea of ‘transient space’ (Flock &
Breitung, 2016) represents a post-dualist position. Transient space re-
fers to the openness and ﬂuidity of spaces, where “[t]he dynamics be-
tween street vendors and state agents show how people, goods, rules,
and regulation are in continuous change, incessantly constituting
space anew” (Flock & Breitung, 2016, p. 166). Transient spaces signify
the spatial hierarchy in policy enforcement, as discussed in the previous
section, which shows that spaces are layered, ﬂuid and contingent on
structural factors and human agency. When linked to urban planning,
this entails going beyond the usual purpose and character of city zoning
and land use plan, which typically maps out areas for settlement, com-
mercial, transport and institutional use, among others.
In this regard, it is crucial to explore what de Souza (2006) calls
‘urban reform-oriented’ planning. By urban reform, he refers to the Bra-
zilian experience where.
“…professional planners utilize land use management tools for pur-
poses such as identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of speciﬁc spaces ac-
cording to their social situation and public interest (for instance,
zones corresponding to areaswhich need upgrading and tenure reg-
ularization, zones of special interest for environmental protection,
and areas where land is kept vacant due to speculation).” (de
Souza, 2006, p. 337).
In this framework, the participation of ordinary citizens is an integral
dimension of the planning process. This contradicts the technocratic
vista, which often looks at planning instruments as too technical to
merit active citizen involvement. This planning approach is worth ex-
ploring in light of a post-dualist contention on the need to situate infor-
mal vending as embedded in economic structuring as well as socio-
spatial relations of various stakeholders. This can build on the lessons
from accommodating policy instruments and tolerant practices,
discussed in the previous section.
In sum, these emerging notions pertaining to urban governance and
planning indicate that a dualistic framework is inherently deﬁcient in
the midst of a complex web of structural constraints, socio-spatial rela-
tions and different expressions of agency. The presence of overlapping
policy epistemologies with layered and spatialized enforcement mech-
anisms warrant further empirical investigation using the post-dualistPlease cite this article as: Recio, R.B., et al., Revisiting policy epistemolog
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.08.018lens. This approach can likewise inform future research initiatives focus-
ing on various forms and business models of street vending in various
countries.
4. Conclusion
Based on the analysis of worldwide cases on state policies on infor-
mal vending, the paper shows how the structurationist lens can support
a better understanding of the different government approaches to
urban informal vending. By classifying these approaches into policy
epistemologies, the paper draws attention to the relationship of policy
models to images of informality and the role of structure-agency inter-
action in producing and reproducing policy orientations.While the cho-
sen cases are far from exhaustive, the paper has demonstrated that
some emerging patterns have critical implications to urban studies
and city planning research and theorizing.
The paper argues on the need to embrace a post-dualist lens, which
underscores that the structure-agency nexus is a useful analytical tool in
examining the inherent relations between formal and informal activi-
ties. The presence of overlapping policy epistemologies and spatialized
enforcement mechanisms ampliﬁes the need for a post-dualist ap-
proach. When tied to planning praxis, the post-dualist stance sees the
notion of ‘urban reform-oriented’ planning as a responsive approach
to urban informality, particularly street vending issues.
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